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Flag Burning and the Constitution
Geoffrey R. Stone*
I will consider four questions in this essay: First, was
the decision in Texas v. Johnson' correct? Second, is it
possible to draft legislation that prohibits flag burning without running afoul of Johnson? Third, is it
possible to draft legislation that prohibits flag burning without running afoul of the first amendment?
And fourth, should we amend the Constitution to
overrule Johnson? In short, my answers are yes, yes,
possibly, and no.
I
In Johnson the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas
statute that prohibited any person from desecrating
the American flag by defacing, damaging or otherwise physically mistreating it "in a way that the actor
knows will seriously offend one or more persons
likely to observe or discover his action," as applied
to an individual who publicly burned the flag as a
form of political protest. The Court's decision in
Johnson was premised upon a sound understanding
of well-settled principles of first amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, Johnson followed quite sensibly
from some of the most basic, most firmly established
and most well-reasoned precepts of American constitutional law.
At the outset, it is useful to note that Johnson was
not the Court's first encounter with government
efforts to command respect for the flag by restricting
expression. In West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette,I the Court held that a state could not constitutionally punish a student for refusing to salute the
flag; in Street v. New York," the Court held that a state
could not constitutionally punish an individual for
speaking contemptuously about the flag; in Smith v.
Goguen,4 the Court held that a state could not constitutionally punish an individual for treating the flag
*Harry KalvenJr. Professor of Law and Dean, the University
of Chicago Law School. "Flag Burning and the Constitution"
was first published in 75 Iowa Law Review Ill (1989) and is
reprinted with permission. @ 1989 University of Iowa (Iowa
Law Review). This reprinting omits most of the footnotes.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
2. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
3. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
4. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
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contemptuously by wearing a replica of the flag sewn
to the seat of his pants. The court, in Spence v. Washington,5 held that a state could not constitutionally
punish an individual for misuse of the flag by affixing to the flag a large peace symbol made of removable tape. Although none of these decisions dealt
directly with flag burning, they set the stage for
Johnson.
The Johnson decision was based upon a critical distinction in first amendment doctrine. Central to the
Court's reasoning was the question whether the
Texas statute was "related" or "unrelated" to the
suppression of free expression. This distinction, first
articulated in United States v. O'Brien,6 reflects an
effort to distinguish between those laws that are
designed to restrict speech and those that have only
an incidental effect on speech. The premise of this
distinction is that, from a first amendment perspective, the former are more problematic than the latter.
For purposes of this distinction, a law is "related
to the suppression of free expression" if it (a) explicitly restricts speech, or (b) does not explicitly restrict
speech, but is justified by reference to interests that
are directly related to the restriction of speech, or (c)
does not explicitly restrict speech, but restricts
expressive conduct because of the reactions of others
to the content of the message conveyed. A law is
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression" if it
(a) does not explicitly restrict speech, and (b) is not
justified by reference to interests that are directly
related to the restriction of speech, and (c) does not
restrict expressive conduct because of the reactions
of others to the content of the message conveyed.
It may help if I offer a few illustrations. A law that
prohibits any person from making any speech in a
public park is "related to the suppression of free
expression" because it explicitly restricts speech. A
law that prohibits any loud noises in a public park in
order to shield users of the park from offensive
speech is "related to the suppression of free expression" because it is justified by reference to interests
that are directly related to the restriction of speech.
And a law that prohibits any loud noises in a public
park that may trigger a riot is "related to the suppression of free expression" because it restricts
expressive conduct because of the reactions of others
to the content of the message conveyed.
5. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
6. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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On the other hand, a law that prohibits any person from driving in excess of fifty-five miles per hour
is "unrelated to the suppression of free expression,"
even as applied to an individual who speeds in order
to get to a political rally or to express his dissatisfaction with speed limits, because such a law does not
explicitly restrict speech, it is not justified by reference to interests that are directly related to the
restriction of speech, and it does not restrict expressive conduct because of the reactions of others to the
content of the message conveyed.
This distinction was critical in Johnson because it
was the ground upon which the Court distinguished
its prior decision in O'Brien, in which the Court
upheld a conviction for draft card burning. At first
glance, O'Brien seemed the obviously controlling
precedent. After all, if the government can punish an
individual who publicly burns a draft card.as a form
of symbolic expression, it would seem to follow that
it can also punish an individual who publicly burns
an American flag as a form of symbolic expression.
In O'Brien, the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting any person from forging, altering, knowingly destroying, or knowingly mutilating a draft
card, as applied to an individual who publicly
burned his draft card as an act of political protest. In
reaching this decision, the Court explained that the
draft card statute had only an incidental effect on
speech because it did not explicitly regulate expression. Its asserted purpose-to facilitate the administration of the selective service laws-was unrelated
to the restriction of speech, and it applied to all violators without regard to whether they had engaged in
expressive conduct and without regard to the communicative impact of their expression. The Court
concluded that, in such circumstances, the law was
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression"
and thus should be tested by a relatively deferential
standard of review.
In Johnson, the Court held that, unlike the draft
card statute at issue in O'Brien, the Texas statute was
not "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." To the contrary, the Court explained that
"[t]he Texas law is... not aimed at protecting the
physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but
is designed instead to protect it only against impairments that would cause serious offense to others. "
Thus, unlike the situation in O'Brien, "Johnson's
treatment of the flag violated Texas law" because of
"the likely communicative impact of his expressive
3

conduct." The Court concluded that, in such circumstances, the Texas law was not a mere incidental
restriction of speech, but was directly "related to the
suppression of free expression."
Although this analysis served effectively to distinguish O'Brien, it did not in itself mandate the invalidation of the challenged statute, for not all laws that
are "related to the suppression of free expression"
are unconstitutional. To the contrary, within the
realm of laws that are "related to the suppression of
free expression" there is a further distinction
between those that are content-neutral and those
that are content-based.
Content-neutral restrictions limit expression without regard to the content of the message conveyed.
Laws that prohibit noisy speeches near a hospital,
ban billboards in residential communities, or restrict
the distribution of leaflets in public places are examples of content-neutral restrictions. Content-based
restrictions, on the other hand, limit expression
because of the message conveyed. Laws that prohibit
seditious libel, ban the publication of confidential
information, or restrict speeches that may trigger a
hostile audience response illustrate this type of
restriction. Content-based restrictions are especially
problematic under the first amendment, for by
restricting only some messages and not others such
laws are especially likely to distort the substantive
content of public debate and to mutilate the thought
processes of the community. Thus, unlike contentneutral restrictions, which are generally subject to a
form of ad hoc balancing, content-based laws are
presumptively invalid.
As the Court recognized in johnson, the Texas flag
desecration statute was explicitly content-based.
Indeed, the Texas law directly violated the
"bedrock" first amendment principle "that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable." The Court thus concluded that this
"content-based" restriction could withstand constitutional challenge only if the state's interest could
survive "the most exacting scrutiny."
In my judgment, the Court's analysis of O'Brien
and of the Texas flag desecration statute was clearly
correct and essentially uncontroversial as a matter of
both precedent and principle. Nonetheless, several
arguments have been advanced in opposition to
Johnson.
First, it has been suggested that Johnson's act of
4

burning the American flag as a form of political protest was not "speech" within the meaning of the first
amendment. On this view, the first amendment protects only written and spoken communication. At
least since its 1928 decision in Stromberg v. California,I
however, the Court has rejected this crabbed view of
the first amendment, and rightly so. Any act that is
intended to communicate and is reasonably understood by others as communication should fall within
the first amendment's protection of "speech." This
includes not only the written and spoken word, but
sign language for the deaf, picketing, parading, the
wearing of black armbands, and the public burning
of the American flag. Indeed, because of its unique
emotive power, symbolic expression is often an especially effective means of conveying the depth of one's
convictions.
Most of the perplexity traditionally associated
with the issue of symbolic expression was due to the
relative rigidity of first amendment doctrine in the
early stages of its evolution. Consider the difficulty
of attempting to integrate unconventional means of
expression into a doctrinal structure that tests all
restrictions of speech with a single, overarching
standard, such as "clear and present danger." Such
"expressive" acts as urinating on a public building
or publicly letting the air out of the tires of a government official's car in symbolic protest of government
policy would strain such a doctrinal structure to the
breaking point. Is the interest in preventing public
urination or minor acts of vandalism of sufficient
"gravity" to satisfy the clear and present danger
standard? If so, we run the risk of diluting a standard
that must protect free speech against government
efforts to censor seditious libel and subversive advocacy. If not, does that mean that society must tolerate
such bizarre forms of expression? The simplest
"solution" in such a doctrinal framework is, of
course, to avoid the problem entirely by defining
such expressive conduct as "non-speech."
Because of the two distinctions discussed abovethe "related/unrelated" distinction and the "contentbased/content-neutral" distinction-symbolic speech
issues are readily manageable under existing first
amendment doctrine. Such issues are now analyzed
by asking, first, whether the challenged restriction is
related or unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and, second, if the latter, whether the
7. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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restriction is directed at the content of the symbolic
expression. The results of these two inquiries will
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. This
more subtle analysis has enabled first amendment
jurisprudence to accommodate a broader conception
of "speech" by focusing more precisely on the specific dangers associated with different types of
restrictions.
Second, it has been argued that the Texas statute
might be upheld under the "fighting words" doctrine. But that doctrine has no application inJohnson.
The fighting words doctrine governs only personal
insults or epithets that are intended and understood
not as communication, but as verbal assaults; the
doctrine contains an implicit requirement of likely
and imminent danger, in that the speech must be
likely to cause the average addressee to fight; and the
doctrine applies only to face-to-face encounters
where the speech is directed at a particular, individual addressee. None of these elements was present in
Johnson. Only a dramatic and wholly unwarranted
expansion of this doctrine could justify its application in the circumstances presented in]ohnson.
Third, it has been suggested that the Texas statute
might be sustained under the "hostile audience"
doctrine. On this view, the government can prohibit
flag desecration because such expressive conduct
may cause others to react in a hostile manner. Whatever vitality this doctrine may retain beyond the narrow confines of the fighting words doctrine, it has no
bearing on Johnson. Because the hostile audience
rationale for suppressing speech invites what Harry
Kalven aptly termed the "heckler's veto," 8 the Court
has long recognized that the government may
restrict speech for this reason, if at all, only on a specific factual showing that the danger of violent audience response is likely, imminent, grave, and beyond
the capacity of government to control with reasonable law enforcement resources.Johnson was not even
remotely such a situation.
Finally, it has been argued that the Texas flag desecration statute should be understood not as a
restriction on the expression of an idea-hostility to
the policies of the United States government-but as
a restriction on the use of a potential means of
expression-the American flag. To the extent this
argument implies that the Texas flag desecration
8. Harry Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment 141
(1966).
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statute was a regulation of means rather than content, it is clearly wrong. The Texas statute restricted
the use of the flag as a means of expression only when
it was used to convey ideas that are "offensive" to
others. As the Court recognized, that is a paradigm
example of content-based regulation.
The main thrust of this argument must thus be
that the Texas statute should be exempt from "the
most exacting scrutiny" because it did not totally
ban the expression of an idea, but merely restricted
its expression through a single means of communication-flag desecration. For several quite compelling
reasons, however, including the equality principle,
the risk of distorting the substantive content of public debate, the inability confidently to distinguish
between "significant" and "modest" content-based
restrictions, and concerns about impermissible governmental motivation, the Court has never accepted
such a limitation on its scrutiny of content-based
restrictions. Indeed, just as the Court does not dilute
its standard on the ground that a challenged law has
only a "modest" rather than a "significant" effect
when it considers the constitutionality of laws that
discriminate against blacks, so too does it eschew
such an inquiry when it considers the constitutionality of laws that discriminate against particular points
of view. Laws that prohibit anti-abortion leafleting
on the steps of the Capitol, or anti-civil rights
speeches in the Lincoln Memorial, or anti-war desecrations of the American flag are appropriately subject to "the most exacting scrutiny" even though
they limit the expression of specific points of view
only through particular means of communication.
The evil of such laws is that they discriminate against
specific political viewpoints, without regard to the
relative "severity" of the restriction.
II
Is it possible to draft legislation that restricts flag
burning without running afoul ofJohnson? Consider
the following statute: "No person may knowingly
impair the physical integrity of the American flag. "9
In my view, Johnson does not dictate the invalidation
of this statute.
9. To make such a law plausible, assume that it defines
"American flag" to exclude anything other than "official" representations of the flag (e.g. made of cloth, of a certain size and
shape, etc.) and that it stipulates some "accepted" method for
the ceremonial disposition of such "official" flags.
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The key point is this: The Court did not hold in
Johnson that there is an inviolable first amendment
right to burn the American flag as a means of political protest. Rather, Johnson was expressly predicated
on the Court's double-barreled conclusion that the
Texas law was related to the suppression of free
expression and content-based. Thus, the Court held
only that the specific Texas flag desecration statute
before it was an unconstitutional means of regulating such expressive conduct. As in other circumstances, it is not simply the nature of the expression,
but also "the governmental interest at stake" and the
nature of the regulation that help "to determine
whether a restriction on... expression is valid."
A few examples may help to clarify. Suppose an
individual is prosecuted for burning an American
flag in public as a means of political protest in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting any person from
making an open fire in a public place. Although
Johnson invalidated the Texas flag desecration statute, it tells us little, if anything, about the constitutionality of this ordinance, for unlike the Texas
statute, the open fires ordinance is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, is not content-based,
and need not be subjected to "the most exacting
scrutiny." The constitutionality of the open fires
ordinance is appropriately governed by O'Brien
rather than Johnson.
Similarly, there can be no doubt that, on the basis
of the principles articulated in O'Brien, the Court
would uphold a statute prohibiting any person from
defacing the Lincoln Memorial, even as applied to
an individual who scrawls politically-oriented graffiti on the Memorial. On the other hand, there also
can be no doubt that, on the basis of the principles
invoked injohnson, the Court would invalidate a statute prohibiting any person from writing "any message critical of the United States" on the Lincoln
Memorial. Although the speech in the two cases is
identical, the first law is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression, content-neutral, and constitutional, whereas the second law, like the Texas statute
invalidated injohnson, is related to the suppression of
free expression, content-based, and violative of the
first amendment.
With this understanding ofJohnson, we can turn to
my hypothetical "flag impairment" statute, which
would prohibit any person from knowingly
impairing the physical integrity of the American
flag. Unlike the Texas law invalidated in johnson, the
8

flag impairment statute does not refer to "desecration" and does not turn in any way on whether the
proscribed conduct "will seriously offend" others.
Indeed, the flag impairment statute applies to the
individual who burns a flag in private to ignite a fire
in his fireplace as well as to the individual who burns
a flag in public to protest government policy. It
applies without regard to whether the conduct takes
place in public or in private, without regard to
whether it is undertaken for expressive or for other
purposes, without regard to whether it offends others, and without regard to the particular message
any individual may seek to convey. Unlike the Texas
law invalidated in Johnson, the hypothetical statute
does not turn on the communicative impact of the
prohibited conduct, it is not content-based, it is not
related to the suppression of free expression, and its
constitutionality is not controlled by the principles
that quite correctly dictated the outcome in Johnson.
Put simply, johnson does not govern the constitutionality of the hypothetical statute.
III
This is not to say, of course, that my hypothetical flag
Impairment statute is constitutional. There are at
least three grounds on which one might question the
constitutionality of this legislation.
First, even if this statute is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and neutral with respect
to content, it may still violate the first amendment as
an impermissible, content-neutral restriction of
speech. A law that is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression and neutral as to content may be
immune from the "most exacting scrutiny" required
of most content-based restrictions, but it is not
immune from constitutional challenge entirely. Even
content-neutral laws may violate the first amendment if their restrictive impact on the opportunities
for free expression outweighs the legitimate governmental interests they serve. In general, however, the
Court has tended to apply relatively deferential
standards of review in cases involving contentneutral restrictions, and this is especially true where,
as in the case of my hypothetical statute, the restriction has only an incidental effect on speech. The
closest analogy is, of cotirse, O'Brien. Indeed, assuming that the government has a constitutionally legitimate interest in protecting the physical integrity of
the flag, a question I will address in a moment,
9

O'Brien strongly suggests that my hypothetical statute would withstand content-neutral review.
A second possible objection turns on the issue of
impermissible legislative motivation. I have no
doubt that if my hypothetical flag impairment statute were enacted in a cynical effort to circumvent
Johnson and to suppress the use of the flag to express
ideas that are offensive to the American people, the
legislation could not constitutionally be enacted.
Perhaps ironically, then, if such legislation were in
fact enacted for such constitutionally impermissible
reasons, the Court would not necessarily invalidate
it on that basis, for although the Court has often
inquired into the motivation underlying executive
and administrative decisions, it has generally
declined to inquire into the motivation underlying
legislative actions. In O'Brien, for example, the
Court, largely for prudential reasons, refused to
inquire into legislative motivation to determine
whether the actual purpose of the draft card statute
was to facilitate the administration of the draft or to
punish those individuals who opposed the selective
service system by burning their draft cards. If this
aspect of O'Brien governs, the Court would be similarly reluctant to inquire into the motivations underlying the hypothetical legislation. 0 The more
interesting question, however, is whether the hypothetical flag impairment statute does, indeed, have a
constitutionally legitimate purpose.
That brings me to the third possible objection,
which may be stated as follows: What, precisely, is
the purpose of this legislation? If it is not designed
merely to circumventJohnson and to suppress the use
10. At least in the religion area, the Court in recent years has
been increasingly willing to invalidate legislation because of
constitutionally impermissible legislative motivation. See e.g.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating Alabama
statute authorizing one minute at beginning of school day "for
meditation or voluntary prayer"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39 (1980) (Kentucky statute requiring posting of Ten Commandments on classroom walls held unconstitutional). In
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), the Court invalidated Louisiana's "Creationism Act." The Act required that
whenever evolution or creationism is taught, "the other must
also be taught." Id. at 581. The stated purpose of the legislation
was to "assure academic freedom." Id. at 600 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Appendix to briefs). Justice Brennan's opinion, however, asserts that "[w]hile the Court is normally
deferential to a state's articulation of a secular purpose, it is
required that the statement of such purpose be sincere." Id. at
586-87. It is at least possible that the Court eventually will
extend these precedents to the free expression area as well.
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of the flag for the expression of offensive opinions,
what is it designed to do? Is there, indeed, any legitimate justification for this legislation that is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression?
The simple answer, of course, is that the hypothetical statute is designed not to censor critics of the flag
or of the nation, but to protect the physical integrity
of the flag itself. It is designed, in other words, to
preserve the flag as an unalloyed symbol of our
nationhood and national unity and to prevent any
physical damage to the flag that might dilute its symbolic power. In the words of the Texas statute, the
purpose of the legislation is to establish the flag as a
"venerated" object.
Is this a legitimate governmental purpose? Is it, in
itself, violative of the first amendment? Johnson,
Goguen, Spence and Street clearly establish that the government cannot constitutionally preserve the flag's
symbolic value by prohibiting others from using it to
express unpatriotic or otherwise offensive messages.
Does it necessarily follow, however, that the government may not attempt to preserve the symbolic value
of the flag by protecting its physical integrity against
all impairments, whether or not they are expressive
and without regard to the content of any particular
message? In what sense is that a constitutionally illegitimate purpose?
Several arguments might be advanced. First, one
might argue that, by prohibiting anyone from
impairing the physical integrity of the flag, my hypothetical statute should be understood as an effort to
promote government speech by prohibiting anyone
from "interrupting" such speech. But this hardly
establishes the purpose as illegitimate. The first
amendment prohibits the government neither from
speaking, nor from speaking effectively, nor from
speaking patriotically, nor from protecting its speech
-patriotic or otherwise-from interruption. There
is simply nothing here that can be said, in and of
itself, to violate the first amendment.
Second, one might argue that this statute is
invalid not because it protects government speech
from interruption, but because it does so in a discriminatory manner. On this view, my hypothetical
flag impairment statute might be analogized to a law
prohibiting any person from interrupting "patriotic" speeches. Such a law would, of course, violate
the first amendment because it explicitly discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. Is the flag impairment statute similarly invalid because it protects the
11

flag without equally protecting all other symbols,
such as the Republican elephant, the Nazi swastika,
the Union Jack, and the hammer and sickle?
I think not. Government speech is different from
private speech. It serves different functions. It is not
at all clear that the government must provide the
same protection to private speech as it provides its
own. Suppose, for example, a town council regularly
posts the minutes of its meetings on a kiosk in the
town square and prohibits anyone from removing,
destroying or defacing these minutes. Must the town
provide the same protection to all notices that are
posted on the kiosk or, for that matter, in the town? If
the government grants landmark status to Independence Hall, must it grant similar status to the building in which the Socialist Workers Party drafted its
first constitution? Laws that accord special protection to governmental symbols cannot fairly be
equated to content-based restrictions favoring
"patriotic" speech. The problems of government
speech and government symbols are simply too complex to be governed by so easy an analogy.
Third, one might argue that if the purpose of my
hypothetical flag impairment statute is to preserve
the symbolic value of the flag, the only acts of physical impairment that would actually undermine that
purpose are those that are designed to convey a different and inconsistent message. Other acts of physical impairment, such as the use of the flag to light a
fire in one's fireplace, would not dilute the flag's
symbolic value and could not rationally be brought
within the scope of the law's prohibition. On this
view, the statute would clearly seem to be "related to
the suppression of free expression," for only acts of
physical impairment that involve speech would
threaten the government's interest.
It is not at all clear, however, that the flag's status
as a symbolic or venerated object would be impaired
only by its use to convey inconsistent messages. Certainly there are religious groups who proscribe the
physical impairment of venerated objects without
regard to either the expressive purpose of the object
or the expressive intent of the individual who defaces
it. Moreover, one can readily understand why the
government might want to prohibit impairment of
the physical integrity of the flag, whether or not the
impairment consists of express conduct.
Suppose Congress decides that because the bald
eagle is the symbol of the United States no one
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should be allowed to kill bald eagles. (Suppose also
that there is no shortage of bald eagles, so the example is not complicated by any concern about preserving the bald eagle as an endangered species.) Against
this background is a law that prohibits any person
from knowingly killing a bald eagle violative of the
first amendment because it furthers a constitutionally illegitimate purpose? What is the illegitimate
purpose? Surely the law is not designed to suppress
anyone's expression, for so far as I know no one has
ever killed a bald eagle as a symbolic expression of
opposition to government policy. Indeed, from this
perspective, the law is clearly no more "related to the
suppression of free expression" than the draft card
law upheld in O'Brien.
It is no doubt troubling-at least to me-that the
government might want to establish the bald eagle as
a venerated object. But I can think of no sound reason for concluding that it is constitutionally illegitimate for the government to do this. The government
can legitimately speak without violating the first
amendment, it can legitimately speak patriotically
without violating the first amendment, it can legitimately employ symbols of patriotism without violating the first amendment, and it can legitimately
prohibit the destruction of such symbols of patriotism so long as its purpose is not to restrict anyone else's
expression. II

If the bald eagle statute serves a legitimate government interest, it would seem to follow that the hypothetical flag impairment statute may serve a
11. It is possible, of course, that the bald eagle statute might
some day be invoked to punish an individual who shoots a bald
eagle in symbolic protest of American foreign policy. But that is
not unconstitutional, for the effect is wholly incidental and is
clearly governed by O'Brien. It is also possible that the government might eventually declare so many symbols of national
unity to be "venerated" objects that, in cumulation, this would
have a serious effect on the opportunities for free expression. For
example, the government might declare not only the bald eagle,
but also the flag, the visage of the President, copies of the Constitution, and all pictures of the Capitol, the White House, and
the Supreme Court to be "venerated" objects. The inability of
citizens to impair the physical integrity of all these objects in
symbolic protest of government policy might have a serious,
even if only incidental, effect on the overall opportunities for
free expression. But the answer to this concern, in this as in
related contexts involving incidental restrictions of speech, is to
deal with the problem if and when we come to it. In any event,
this concern goes only to the constitutionality of the law as a
content-neutral restriction of speech. It does not go to the legitimacy of the government's interest.
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constitutionally legitimate interest as well. Indeed,
the only distinction is that in the bald eagle situation
we can perhaps more readily accept as plausible the
government's claim that its actual purpose is to protect the symbol rather than to suppress expression,
whereas in the flag situation we are, at a minimum,
suspicious of the sincerity of this claim. In light of
O'Brien, however, this is most likely a distinction
without constitutional implications.
I would like to add two final points. First, I do not
mean to suggest that I favor the enactment of my
hypothetical statute. To the contrary, it would be thoroughly impractical, it would restrict a useful means of
expression for little reason, and it would almost certainly be adopted for constitutionally impermissible
reasons. My effort here is to explore the rather different question whether such a law, however inadvisable,
might nonetheless be constitutional.
Second, I should point out that the legislation
actually enacted by Congress in response to Johnson
does not pose quite as clean an issue as my hypothetical statute. Rather than prohibiting any person from
impairing the physical integrity of the flag, the
actual legislation prohibits any person from mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, maintaining on the
floor or ground, or trampling upon any flag of the
United States.12 Although this legislation avoids the
most serious difficulties of the Texas statute-it is not
directed explicitly at expression, it does not turn on
communicative impact, and it is not concerned with
the extent to which others find the expression offen12. Act of Oct. 28. 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777
(1989) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 700). The legislation states
in relevant part:
(a)(1) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles,
burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any
flag of the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(2) This subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of
the disposal of a flag when it has become worn or soiled.
(b) As used in this section, the term "flag of the United States"
means any flag of the United States, or any part thereof, made
of any substance, of any size, in a form that is commonly displayed.
(d)(1) An appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of
the United States from any interlocutory or final judgment,
decree, or order issued by a United States district court ruling
upon the constitutionality of subsection (a).
(2) The Supreme Court shall, if it has not previously ruled on
the question, accept jurisdiction over the appeal and advance on
the docket and expedite to the greatest extent possible.
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sive-it does employ phrases that are ideologically
charged and that carry at least some of the same connotations as "desecration." Thus, the legislation
actually enacted well might be brought within the
scope of the Johnson decision even though, like my
hypothetical statute, it avoid the more flagrant deficiencies of the Texas flag-desecration statute.

IV
I would like to conclude with a few thoughts on the
constitutional amendment that the Bush Administration proposed in its effort to overrideJohnson. The
proposed amendment provided that "Congress and
the States shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the Flag of the United States.""
4
Congress rightly rejected this proposal.'
Before I offer my reasons for that conclusion, however, I would like to address two arguments that were
made against the amendment that I found quite
unpersuasive. First, it was argued that, if enacted,
the proposed amendment would effectively have
amended not only the first amendment, as interpreted in Johnson, but all other constitutional provisions as well, including the fourth amendment, the
self-incrimination clause, the due process clause and
the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Thus, on
this view, the proposed amendment, if enacted,
would have authorized legislation allowing searches
for evidence of flag desecration based on less than
probable cause, denying flag desecration defendants
the right to counsel and inflicting the death penalty
on flag desecrators. This is sheer nonsense. The proposed amendment was explicitly and unambiguously designed to overrule Johnson. It was not
understood as, and would not be interpreted as, a
broadscale obliteration of the other protections of the
Constitution in prosecutions for flag desecration.
Second, it was argued that the proposed amendment would fail to achieve its explicit objective, for it
would appropriately be construed by the Court as
incorporating existing law-including the decision
inJohnson. In light of the unambiguous background
of the proposed amendment, I find this argument
unpersuasive in the extreme.

13. S.J. Res. 180, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
14. The proposed amendment failed to pass the Senate on
Oct. 19, 1989. See 142 Cong. Rec. S 13,733 (daily ed. Oct. 19,
1989) (51 for, 48 against).
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There were, however, sound reasons to reject the
proposed constitutional amendment. First, and most
narrowly, given a choice between a legislative
response tojohnson and a constitutional amendment,
the legislative route was in every respect the more
sound. The Supreme Court has long been guided by
the general principle that it should not address constitutional questions unless it cannot otherwise
resolve the dispute before it. This recognition of an
important limitation on the power of judicial review
has well served the Court. The same principle should
govern in this situation as well. If Congress can
address a problem through legislative action, it
should ordinarily pursue the legislative solution before
resorting to the more solemn processes of constitutional amendment.
Second, even if the Court eventually holds that
there is no method by which the government can
constitutionally protect the physical integrity of the
flag through legislation, a constitutional amendment to overrule Johnson would be undesirable
becauseJohnson itself was premised upon sound principles of constitutional theory. The "bedrock" principle that government should not "prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable" is not only a
correct interpretation of the first amendment, it is
wise public policy in a free and self-governing society. An amendment that would carve that principle
from the Constitution would ultimately weaken
rather than strengthen our constitutional order.
And third, even if this "bedrock" principle, as
applied to flag desecration, is not a necessary predicate of democratic government, the amendment
would still be unwarranted, for as important as the
flag may be, and as offensive as desecration of the
flag may be, a constitutional amendment to narrow
the protections of the first amendment would be
15. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not 'anticipate a question
of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it."'
(quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))); see also
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040,
3060-61 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Where there is no need to decide a constitutional question, it is a venerable principle of this Court's
adjudicatory processes n6t to do so"); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-55 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring ) (courts "do not review issues, especially
constitutional issues, until they have to").
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wholly unprecedented in the two hundred years of
our constitutional history-and for good reason.
The Constitution is our fundamental charter of government. We should not tamper with it to adjust for
what must fairly be understood as matters of only
secondary importance in the overall scheme of
American government. We have not in the past, and
we should not in the present, submit to the temptation to invoke the processes of constitutional amendment to override a decision of the Supreme Court
just because it offends-or even deeply offends-a
substantial majority of our citizens. Such a practice
would clutter, trivialize, and, indeed, denigrate the
Constitution. We should recognize the flag issue for
what it is-a profoundly controversial and inflammatory dispute over what in the grand scheme of
constitutional government is ultimately a matter of
secondary importance. It does not warrant resort to
the most profoundly solemn act our nation can pursue-amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.
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